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75 - 90 minutes 
20 Task Force Members and Staff plus 45 - 50 observers and 
media representatives 
Competitive vs Regulatory Approaches for Containing Health 
Care Costs 
MAJOR POINTS: o To describe health care cost trends, particularly in 
Florida. 
PURPOSE: 
o To describe the effects of rising health care cost on 
consumers, employers, and the insurance industry. 
o To delineate market characteristics and results of 
regulatory vs. competition (market) approaches to the 
health care cost problem. 
o To assess the Florida environment and the Florida health 
care and insurance marketplace. 
o To recommend specific market-oriented solutions which the 
public and private sectors can implement to contain health 
care cost increases. 
o To describe the essential nature of the health care cost 
problem in Florida. 
o To outline the market characteristics and results of the 
regulatory and the competitive models. 
o To assess the distinctive environmental characteristics of 
the Florida health care and insurance marketplace. 
o To recommend specific, marketplace-based solutions which 
the public and private sectors can implement to contain 
health care costs. 
o To demonstrate that regulation is threatening the 
existence of health insurers by preventing their ability 
to innovate and meet market needs. 
OUTLINE 
I. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
II. PURPOSE OF THE PRESENTATION 
III. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
IV. ECONOMICS OF HEALTH CARE 
V. DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM: SOME ALTERNATIVE MODELS 
VI. AN ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT OF THE HEALTH CARE AND INSURANCE 
MARKETPLACES 
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I. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
0 
Puq�ose: 
To summarize the Plan's position on dealing with the Florida health care 
cost problem. 
COMPETITION APPROACHES NEEDED TO 
• Promote Innovation 
- Delivery of Care 
- Financing of Care 






l. What is needed are widely available, competitive suppliers of 
both delivery and financing alternatives in a competitive, 
unregulated {minimally regulated) environment. 
2. Competition is the only viable alternative that will 
a. ensure innovation in health care delivery and financing; 
b. create the incentives that lead to efficiency and 
productivity. 
3. We believe it is the State's role to promote a market or 
business climate that promotes the above. 
4. Regulation is a barrier to their achievement, stifling 
efficiency and innovation. 
5. We will work on behalf of our· subscribers in any environment to 
make it as cost effective as possible. To the extent that 
regulatory solutions may be adopted, we strongly encourage and 
advise that new innovative approaches we endorse be exempt from 
traditional regulation under the current insurance code. 
B. Recommendations 
RECDr!m i!l�.T !Ot!S 
1. DEREGULATE PROVIDERS AND INSURERS 
2, PASS EXCESS PROFITS LAW 
3, EsTABLI SH GovEilNOR' s COMM I ss I ON AND CONDUCT STUDY 
4, ESTABLISH O1/Ei<SIGHT COMMITTEE IN LEGISLATURE 
5, ELIMINATE MANDATED BENEFITS 
6, ALTER MED I C.l. ID PROGRAM 
O PRUDENT BUYER 
O PROSPECT! VE REIMBURSEMENT 
7, PROTECT PPQ AtlD NET\:ORK DEVELOPMENT 
Therefore, we urge that the Task Force recommend the following: 
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1. DEREGULATION OF INSURORS AND HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS that may 
choose to offer innovative competitive options, particularly in 
the individual and small group markets. 
o BCBSF will guarantee operating in this market. 
o Regulation will take the form of providing for some minimum 
levels of financial accountability. 
2. PASSAGE OF AN EXCESS PROFITS LAW on both traditional health 
insurance and on any competitive alternatives. 
3. ESTABLISHMENT OF A GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION to conduct a 
comprehensive two-to three-year quantitative study to develop a 
state strategy for approaching the problem of cost containment. 
o Conducted by Florida Universities. 
o BCBSF willing to participate and provide significant funding. 
4. ESTABLISHMENT OF AN OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE IN THE LEGISLATURE that 
would ensure growth of competitive alternatives. 
o The State Insurance Department adopt a facilitating role in 
promoting their growth and report annually to the Committee 
on the growth of these alternatives (Growth measured by the 
proportion of people covered in such programs). 
o Ensure that other governmental agencies adopt a facilitating 
role and take on some risk in decision making. 
5. ELIMINATION OF MANDATED BENEFITS to provide insurors the freedom 
to meet market needs and provide consumer with the kinds and 
types of coverages they desire. 
6. STATE SHOULD ADOPT A PRUDENT BUYER POSITION FOR MEDICAID and use 
its buying power. 
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o Medicaid should dramatically improve its benefits, adopt a 
DRG type of reimbursement system. 
o Begin active and rigorous experimentation with innovative 
programs such as those in California and Michigan. 
7. PASS LEGISLATION PROTECTING PPO AND NETWORK DEVELOPMENT similar 
to that passed by the Federal Government for HMO development. 
II. PURPOSE OF THE PRESENTATION 
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o To describe the essential nature of the health care cost problem in 
Florida. 
o To outline the market characteristics and results of the regulatory 
and the competitive models. 
o To assess the distinctive environmental characteristics of the 
Florida health care and insurance marketplaces. 
o To demonstrate that regulation is threatening the existence of 
health insurers by preventing their ability to innovate and meet 
market needs. 
o To recommend specific, marketplace-based solutions which the public 
and private sectors can implement to contain health care costs. 
6 





To educate readers about the components of health care costs. 
PROBLEM STATEMENT 
"The cost of health care, the combined effects 
of price and utilization, is perceived as being too 
high and the rate of increase as out of control 
and unacceptable, thereby negatively affecting 
the delivery, access and quality of the health 
care system." 
· Source: Florida Task Force on Competition & Consumer Choices in-Health Care 
A. Problem Statement 
The Governor's Task Force Statement on the problem of rising health 
care costs in Florida: 
"The cost of health care, the combined effects of price and 
utilization, is perceived as being too high and the rate of increase 
as out of control and unacceptable, thereby negatively affecting the 
delivery, access and quality _of the heal th care system. 11 
1981 STATEWIDE OPINION SURVEY 
... Which of these have contributed most to 




Government Programs 20% 
Improved Care 11 o/o 
Individuals 10% 
Source: Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Florida Corporate 
Communications Division, 1981 
1981 STATEWIDE OPINION SURVEY 
... Which of the following could do the most to 




Insurers 21 o/o 
Individuals 16% 
Source: Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Florida 




B. Scope and Magnitude of the Florida Problem 
o The real point of impact of health care costs is the price of 
health insurance premiums. 
WEIGHTED AVERAGE 
PERCENTAGE INCREASE IN THE PRICE 
OF INSURANCE PREMIUMS - BLUE CROSS & 




· 1980 1981 1982 1983* 
• vear to Date 
Source: Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Florida 
o Rate of increase in premiums in Florida (specific market 
segments; BCBSF Local Group Markets) 
o Premiums = Price of health care services x utilization+ 
administrative costs. 
%/lC =%AP+ %.AQ + (%.oP)(%.6Q) 
Change in 
Total Cost 
Change in Price 
Times 
Change in Utilization 
o Price increases of physician and hospital services result in: 
Increases in premium costs 
Increases in employee risk through cost sharing 
Increases in cost of doing business 
0 
8 






CONSUMER PRICE INDEX: 1972-1982. All Medical 
Care Items 
328.7 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 








CONSUMER PRICE INDEX 
SELECTED MEDICAL CARE COMPONENTS: 
(1972-1982) 
556.7 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 











PER 1,000 POPULATION 
0 X✓ZZ)iy' �x?S✓)';m 
1981 
�- National �� Florida 1111111 Florida Adjusted 
Source: Florida Hospital Cost Containment Board 
TOTAL EXPENSE PER ADJUSTED ADMISSION 
FOR FLORIDA AND THE NATION (1977-1981) 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
$ $ $ $ $ 
Florida 1305 1443 1603 1809 2140 
Florida (Age Adjusted) 1218 1346 1495 1688 1997 
Rate-Setting States 1573 1721 1885 2099 2403 
All Slates and D.C. 1215 1360 1528 .. 1729 2026 
Source: American Hospital Association 
Utilization increases 
Intensity of services 
Itemization of new procedure 
Physicians visits 
Insurers' administration costs 
o Affected parties 
Consumers 
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Cost of health insurance 
Costs of increased cost sharing 
Rationing of health care services 
Eme_l_e>_yers 
Costs of doing business 
Insurers 
Increased premiums can price insurance out of some markets; 
increased regulatory pressure to contain premiums. 
C. A.e,eroach to the Problem 
o The problem of health care costs is a 11given 11 • 
o The question is how to deal with it. 
o Approximately 60% of patient days in Florida accounted for by 
- Medicare 51% 
- Medicaid 7% 
and perhaps for HMOs, PPOs 10% 
M�care and Medicaid 
70% (leaving 30%) 




Also, about 2/3 of hospital cost increases are attributable to 
general inflation and population changes. 
0 
1 1  
Thus only 1/3 of 30%, or about 10% of hospital costs can be 
directly affected by either regulation or competition. 







Source: Health Care Finnncing Review, March, 1983 
1. Specific health care inflation greater than that attributable to 
the general rate of inflation was a minor cause of total 
increase in expenditures over the past decade. 
This implies that little would be gained even through the most 
vigorous price controls 
2. Even the most stringent price regulation will save little, will 
be costly, and have serious side effects. 
o Capital deterioration 
o Stifles innovation 
o Reduction in services 
o People losing coverage - the little guy and small groups 
will be hurt 
12 
Conclusion: A costly/cumbersome rate-setting apparatus is 
considerably less attractive in Florida. 
In Florida, 
o average cost/day exceeds U.S. average 
o average cost/stay is lower than U.S. average 
While total costs and rates of increase are cause for concern, 
there is no compelling justification to rush into regulation 
there is a "window of opportunity" to develop innovative, 





- Alternative delivery/financing systems 
IV. ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM 
Puq�ose: 
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To explain the prevailing economic �t �heor�ies � a�b�ouJ� \t{h�y the heal th care 
market,e lace is in a state of "market failure. 11 
A. How markets are supposed to work. 
o Informed consumers with options 
o Price as a mechanism for allocating goods and services among 
consumers 
B. Why is health care different? 
o Uncertainty concerning risk of illness and appropriateness and 
efficacy of treatment and its costs. 
o Uncertainty about 11 cross-firm 11 competition among hospitals. 
o Information available to consumers inadequate for economic 
decision-making. 
o Economic risk to consumer minimized by insurance and government 
programs. 
Therefore--decision-making has been largely transferred from 
consumers to providers. 
Challenge to hospital cost containment is to share economic 
decision-making among payors, insurers, and providers. 
Choice is between establishing independent third parit (State 
Rate Setting) to act in lieu of and on behalf of payor; 
or 
Encouraging use of leverage of large payors and greater cost 
exposure of individual to influence price, location, and 
appropriateness of service. 
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SUMMARY OF STRATEGIES FOR 








Rate review (statutory) 
Discounting 
Limit charge increase 
Utilization review 
Utilization controls 
Rate review (nonstatutory) 









Tax law changes 
Finance alternate 
systems 









A. The Intensification and Expansion of Regulation Alternative 
Continue Certificate of Need 
Establish an all-payor, prospective rate-setting system. 






Protects uninsured and individually insured as well as 
large groups. 
o Disadvanta2es 
Recent studies and experience indicate rate regulation of 
limited effectiveness. 
Rewards inefficient providers at the expense of the 
efficient. 
Discourages experimentation, development of alternatives. 
Creates franchises while stifling competition. 
Cumbersome, expensive. 
B. The Regulat�r:y Model 
1. Overview 
Pureose: 
To detail the limited number of situations where regulation is 
justified. 
2. General Economic Justification 
o For the U.S. economy wage & price controls have been used 
in desperate situations 
- an emergency character 
- termination and return to free markets as soon as 
possible. 
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o Good public policy provides for a minimum of regulation and 
promotes market freedom and functioning. 
o Natural monopolies (public utilities) 
o Public Utility Model not applicable to health care 
- overlapping service areas 
- different case mixes 
- different input (labor) costs 
- don't have a standard against which to measure or 
guarantee ROI 
- Tl8 & Tl9 won't pay more than under DRG. (Maryland 
Situation) 
o Avoidance of destructive price competition 
o Protection of producers (milk) 
o "Overriding public interest" (hospitals) 
o When regulation takes over, the question of public support 
becomes much less critical for each individual application 
of the rules. The voice of the regulated then becomes 
heard and overshadows the voice of the general public. 
Most regulatory policies are carried out without direct 
public involvement and their success from one case to the 
next does not depend on public involvement. Individual 
decisions would be of interest only to the individuals 
affected even though the aggregate of decisions will 
certainly concern everyone (e.g. , Increase in beds/1OOO 




C. Regulation in the Health Care Industry 
1. Seo�. Health care is heavily regulated in all aspects. 
0 
0 
Quality - Licensure, Accreditation. 
Price and Revenue - Rate Setting, Medicare. 
Balloon theory 
How beaten 
U.S. MEDICARE UTILIZATION DATA 
Number of Days of 
Discharges Care Per 
ALOS Per1000 1000 
Total Enrollees Enrollees 
1973 11.7 302.8 3,547 
1974 11.5 317.0 3,646 
1975 11.2 321.0 3,595 
1976 11.1 326.5 3,632 
1977 10.9 335.1 . 3,651 
I . Source: Health Care Financing Review, March 1982. 









1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Source: Health Policy Center, Vanderbilt University 
6 States With 
Manditory Rate 
Setting 
















COST PER ADJUSTED PATIENT DAY 
6 States With 
Manditory Rate 
Setting 
41 States Without 
Manditory Rate 
Setting 
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Source: Health Policy Center, Vanderbilt University 








1969 1970 1971 197219731974 19751976 1977 19781979 1980 
Source: Health Policy Center, Vanderbilt University 
6 States With 
Mandltory Rate 
Setting 
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Uti l i zati on - PSRO - GAO report o n  why PSRO s fa i l ed 
I 
PSROs 
DOUBTFUL THAT THEY PRODUCE A NET SAVINGS , "  
" ,  , , SAV I NGS  GENERATED , , , ARE ABOUT 30 PERCENT LESS 
THAN PROGRAM COSTS , "  
SOURCE: THE EFFECT OF psqcs ON f-:eo1 TH rARE rosrs, 
CONGRESS 1 OIIAL BUDGET OFF I CE, 1979, 
l·!HY AREil 'T PSRCs MORE EFFECTiVE? 
o CHARPCTER ISTICS OF HE.4LTH CARE SYSTE1'i 
- UNAVAI LAB I LITY OF SNF BEDS 
- TEST SCHEDULING AND DISCHARGE PLANNING 
- ROEMER EFFECT (EMPTY BEDS GrnERATE DEMAND) 
- LITTLE COORDHIATION W I TH HSAs 
- POL I C IES OF RATE-SETT I NG AGENC IES 
- S P I LLOVER EFFECT ( INCREASED IN  OTHER TYPES OF CARE) 
SouRcE: THE fFFEcT of P;-Pns ON f-:EAL TH CARf CosTs, 





t/HY AREN' T PSROs �:ORE EFFC:CTIVE? 
o CH�.RftCTERIST I CS OF PSROs 
·- RELI AflCE ON PHYSICU,::s ;.:rn HCSP!TAL STAFF 
- DELEGATION OF REVIE): RESPONS l 3 I LITY 
- FA ! LURE TO I�:PLE!•:E:lT SAtlCTI CNS 
- PRACT I CAL L I MITS ON CASE REVI,Ei! DATES 
- UNFOCUSED REV I EW 
- QUALITY ASSURAflCE ACTIVI TIES 
SOURCE : THE FfEi=�r OF P� 0/'Js c:1 HEALTH 1;aE [osTs. 
CoNGRESS I 01,AL BUDGET OFF! CE, 1979 , 
o E ntry and Expans i on - CON , 1 1 99 - CON approval has economi c 
val ue - I f  cab l i cense i n  Ch i cago = $30K , what i s  a CON for 
1 00 beds worth? 
RESUL TS OF CON 
o Lit igat ion 
• Franchising 
• Growth of Beds per 1 ,000 
CON CASELOAD IN FLORIDA 
249 Administrative Hearing 
29 District Court of Appeal 
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COMMUNITY HOSPITAL BEDS PER 1000 
POPULA T/ON IN FLORIDA 
4 .60 4.70 4 .64 4 .75 4 .73 4.70 
4 .5  4 .40 
4 .o9 4 05 4 01 3 96 4 · 12  === 
== === === === == == 




3 .0 _ - � 
2 . 5  _ --
-
2.0 = 
1 . 5 - � 
1 .0 
- - � 
0 = = = = = =
= = = = = == 
1 970 1 971 1 972 1 973 1 974 1 975 1 976 1 977 1 978 1 979 1 980 1 981 
Percent Change, 1971-1981: + 16.0% 
Source: Florida Hospital Association 
BEDS PER 1 , 000 
% CHANGE 1 971 -81  
Florida United States 
+ 1 6% + 4% 
(Not Age-Adjusted) 
Source: Florida Hospital Association 
Access - Hill-Burton. 
Benefits - Mandatory benefit and coverage 
MANDA TED BENEFITS 
• I ncreases i n  Uti l ization 





MANDA TED BENEFITS 
• Self- I nsu rers Exempt 
• H igher Premiums 
• Restrictio n  of Consu mer 
Choice 
MANDA TED OFFERINGS 
Alcohol/Drug Abuse Rider 
One Person · Family 
$ 1 .65 $3 .48 
Chiropractic Rider 
One Person Family 
$6 . 59 $1 6 .59 
Source: Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Florida 
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TOTAL A MOUNT PAID FOR OUTPATIENT 







o I �•��wwr-iW? 
1975 1976 1977 1 978 1979 1980 1 981 1982 
Source: Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Massachusetts 
G 
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o I n  the heal th care serv i ces  fi el d ,  control l i ng prices { and 
use) i s  real l y  an i ncome or  emp l oyment control . 







Phys i c i an/Professi onal Charges 
e . g . , In New York the rate regul ators are put i nto the 
posi ti on of approvi ng or di sprovi ng col l ecti ve bargai n i ng 
arrangements . 
cor•'.PARI SO;l OF \IEIGHTS FOR TnE 
AHA Ai':O :im. t:AR!<ET Bf.SKETS 
c1gs2 1rm:-:TS) 
EXPENSE CATEGORY AHA ---
---
PAYROLL . EXPEI-ISE 
\·/AGES AND SALAR ! ES 49 . 80% 
FR ! NGE BENEF ! TS 7 , 60 
f·lONLABCR EXPEM S E  
CAP !TAL 6 . 25 
Fooo Su?PL!  es 4. 01 
FUEL AND OTHER Ur ! L ! T_I ES 5:53 
l NSURANCE 2. 00 
i·\ALPRACT i CE 1 .  60 
P�OPERTY 0 . 40 
PROFE S S !  ONAL FEES 6, 32 
t-iED ! CAL 6 . 32 
GTHER 
OTHER EXPEi/ SES  18 . %  
HCF.� 
51, EO% 
8 . 40 
5 . 72 
2. 70 
3 . 00 
2 . 20 
2 , 20 
4. 78 
4 , 31 
, 47 
21 . 60 
S:ir,RcEs : AHA i!AT ! DtlAL f:osP ! TAL PANEL SuRvEY; U . S .  DEPARH:ENT 
OF Cot•l,'-IERCE, EuREAU OF  Ecorw:: r c  i'.NALYS [ S ,  au.u,� 
Co1- 1n I uor1s Cr GEST; FREELAr:D, :'.ARK S . ,  A:rnERso:i, GERALD 
AND ScHENDLER, CAROL ELLEN , "l''.AT ! OilAL 1-losP I T,\L l : 1 PUT 
PR ! CE . [NDEX, " �0Aj TH C-1go Ft:1Ai1C)I/G REI/IE',/, SU."MER 
1979. 
G 
2 .  
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Results 
IMPACTS OF HEALTH 
CARE COST CONTROLS 
• Decline in Services 
• Lower Employment 
• Reduction in available 
Level of Technology 
• Deterioration of Capital 
• Preservation of · Status Quo 
• Reduction of Innovation 
o Lack of cost containment in states with hospital rate 
setting. 
o Anticipatory price increases. 
3. Reports of savings are coming from regulators themselves -- a 
self-serving appraisal of their own performance. 
4. Objective/scientific studies which measure the impact of many 
variables show little or no savings as a result of rate-setting 
while producing undesirable side effects. 
o Maintains industry structure by insuring continuation of 
inefficient providers. 
o Lack of hospital bankruptcies 
o Discourages competition, innovation, and growth of 
alternative services. 
o Costly and cumbersome regulatory agencies and requirements 
for compliance. 
o Controls on prices will lead to state-run utilization 
(review) management system which will determine who is 
admitted to hospitals. 
o Top priority for hospital administrators is not how to 
become more efficient, but rather, how to 11game 11 the system 
and meet revenue targets . 
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5 .  Other Aspects 
o Too many complex decisions - e.g. HCCB experience 
o Arbitrary rules 
o Causes distortions in the data 
o Lack of data 
o Lack of expertise, maintaining staff competency over time. 
o Won't make the tough decisions 
6. The Real Issue - Regulation Not Equivalent to Hospital 
Rate-Setting 
o Regulation begets regulation 
o Capping hospital rates will not work and total expenditures 
will continue to rise - balloon theory 
o CON has failed 
o Next Stee - control utilization 
- PSRO failures 
- Need review and system to reduce admissions on a case-
by-case basis 
- What will State do that PSROs have not done? 
- Will this be acceptable to the public? 
D. Regulation in The Health Insurance Industry 
1. Regulation of Insurance has not worked. It is destroying the 
ability of insurors to meet market needs: 
o With no competition among providers. 
o Focuses the industry attention on survival issues. 
o Will prevent innovation 





o Approval of premi um rates and pol i cy forms 
o Reporti ng requ i rements 
o Mandated benefi ts and coverages 
FEP experi ence 
I 
BLUE moss NIii BLUE SIi i EW 
fEIIER�L EMl'LOYF.E PHOGRNI 
A!IALYS I S  OF BP.S I C  BLUE SIIIELD PAI D  CLAIMS 
BY OPTION AtlD SELECTEll TYPE OF SERVI CE-1967 AIID 1968 
JACKSONV I LLL fLORIDA- PLAU CODE 590 
1%7 
llo, oF r, 
1968 
0PTIO/I AIID SELECTED hPE OF SERV I CE ���E�
F 




foTAL hL CLA I MS 7L5C5 1,2,891, 1189. 61 C9, 920 25 . 6% $3,280,2E9 .13  
OuTPATIEIH 
SUl!GERY CLAIMS 23,587 $ 410,097.55 211,520 4 . 0� 4112,211 . 70 
% OF foTAL CLA I MS 32 . 9% 14.27. 27 . 31, 13 .5% 
CASES PER 1000 CO/ITRACTS 
PER YEAR 7911 . 9 799 , lj  0 , 6% 
D I AGIIOST IC X-RAY CLAIMS 6 , C73 $ 88,935.82 111,028 lOli . 1% $ 22'1,l00,39 
% OF loTAL CLAIMS 9 . 6% 3 , 1% 15 , 6% 06 , 8% 






PER YEAR 231 . 6  1157, 3 97, 5% 
9,782 l,Sllt.3% $ 130,805 , 90 2 ,5111 . 9% ! U\BORATORY CLA IMS 511 $ 4,951. llt 
¾ OF foTAL CLAIMS 0 . 7X 0 . 2% 10 . 9% Lt . OX 
CASES PEI! }OIJQ COi/TRACTS 
PER YEAR 17 . 2  318 . 9  1,754 . 1% 
BLUE CROSS N!D BLUE Sfl l ELD 
FEDER/IL EMPLOYEE PROGRAM 
NUN13rn OF OUTPATIEIH PSYCflOTllER/\PY VIS I TS PER 1000 CONTRACTS 
llY TYPE OF PRDVIDrn, l97q-1981 
PERCENT 
JNCREAl� lfil llli . illZ l9.ll1 
�.AIIilll 
M 19fill l9fil 19 11 TO 81 
OUTPAT I ENT  V I S I TS 
Pm 1000 CONTRACTS q35, 9 505 , 0  5q2 , o  5q7 , 7  569 , 0  562 . 5  586 , 8  5ll6 , l  
Prncrnr INCREASE 
Dvrn PRE V J ous YEAR 15 . 6% 7 . 3% 0 . 9% 3 ,  9% (l . 1)7,  U% co .m 311 . 1% 
fioN-f>IED I CAL TfiH<AP I ST* 
OUTPAT I ENT V I S I TS 
Pm 1000 CotffRAcrs sq , o  m.2  193 , 2  237 , q  211q , q  26q , q  316 . 3  336 , 3  
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BLUE er.ass M!D BLUE S I I I ELD 
FEDERAL HiPLOY[E PROGPJ\11 
AVERAGE COST PER OUTPI\T IENT PSYCIIOTIIERAPY V I S I T  
B Y  TYPE O F  PROVIDER, 197LH9Bl 
lill lfil l.9Z£ .l9ZZ. 1m ill.9 19.llil 19.81 
£ill.tt.l.lilli. 
AvERAGE CosT 
PER V I S I T  $30 ,  6 6  $33 , 95 $37, 11 $39 ,  03 $1H , 52 $44 . 40 $43 , 47 $52 . 74 
PERCENT I NCREASE 
OVER PREY I ous YEAR 10. 7% 9 , 3% 5 , 2% 6 . 4% 6 , 9% 9 . 2% 8 , 4% 
ifoN-MEIJI CAL T HER AP I ST* 
flVERAGE (OST 
Pm V 1 s 1 T  $26 ,  5 1  $29 ,  58 $31 .  63 $33 , 11 $311 , 96 $37 , 52 $110 , 54 $44 , 68 
PERCENT ) NC REASE 
OvER PREv 1ous YcAR 11 . 6% 6 , 9% IJ . 7% 5 . 6% 7 . 3% 8 , 1% 10 ,27.  
* INCLUDES CL I N I CAL PSYCHOLOG I STS, PSYCH IATR I C  SOC IAL 1/0RKERS, AND PSYCH IATR IC  NURSES 
o Mandatory "cost containment" programs 
o Coinsurance and deductibles 
l9Z9 rn 1981 
71 . 4% 
68 , 5% 
3. Regulatory Threats to Health Insurance Industry 
o Underwriting results 
-BCBSF 
-Health Insurance industry 
HEALTH INSURANCE INDUSTRY 
TOT AL UNDERWRITING LOSSES 
(IN MILLIONS) 
1980 1981 1 982 
Commercial Insurers 
Blue Cross - Blue Shield 
($1 ,431 .3) ($2,035.1)  ($2,3 14.2) 
426.5) ($ 463.8) ($ 494.5) 
Source: Argus Charts, 1981-83 
Blue Cross & Blue Shield Association 
BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD OF FLORIDA, INC. 
FINANCIAL RES UL TS 
- 1 982 -
Total Revenue 

















/\CC I DE11T & HE.O,LTH WSURM:CE 
FLOR IDA - 1982 





CONf!ECTI CUT GEi·!EPJ.L 
METROPOLITAN 
EQUITP.BLE 
AMER I CAil HERITP.GE 
CRO\IN LI FE 
MASSACHUSETTS r:UTUAL 
GULF LIFE GROUP 





24, 559, ELfO 
1 ,341 ,690 
C 33, 093 , E85l 
31,581,675 
36, 071, 737 
( 60, 707, 605) 
( 2,882,297) 
( 16,477, 529) 
( 44, 000,243) 
( 486,828) 
( 27,666,426) 
( 11, il4, 752 l 
( l!Ll ,167 , 779) 
( $101, 798,393) 
SOURCE: STATE I NSURAMCE DEPARTl'.EilT, 1982 Am1uAL 
STATEMENTS (SCHEDULE r:) 
P.CC I DD!T & HEALTH HISURANCE 
FLORIDA - 1982 
ToTAL UNDERl·:R I T I NG GA IN/ (Loss) P.FTER D I V I DENDS 
PRUDENT IAL 
/\ETNA LI FE 
GULF Lr FE 
TRAVELERS 
CONNECT I CUT GcNERAL 
METROPOL I TAN 
Eau I TABLE 
At·IER I CAN HER ITAGE 
CROl·/N L I FE 
MASSACHUSETTS ;\UTUAL 
GULF LI FE GROUP 
PAC I F I C  MUTUAL 
INTEGor, 
COLON I AL PEN ti 
foTAL 
( $36, 066, 73!! ) 
24 ,559, 640 
1 ,341, 590 
( 33, 093 ,635) 
31, 581, 675 
16, 969,244 
( 79,457 ,119) 
( 2 , 882 ,297) 




( 11,602, 600) 
( 44,167,779i 
( $227, 743, 571 ) 
SOURC E :  STATE INSURANCE DEPARTMErrT, 
1982 P.WJUAL STATEMENTS ( EXH I B I T  H) 
o Enrol l ment resul ts vs . rebu i l di ng of reserves 






o Continued regulatory and inflationary pressures will drive 
many insurers 




and small group 
out of business 
HI.IIE CkO:i:i ,\:IO tll.Uf. !illlf.1.U Uf Hllkl 11.\ 
l111J�rvdLJ.n�l11vc sui1c11t Incon,t!/(l,u:1�1) . 
.. il!L� �Ulllh, l_ 
JIJHJ 0ol lJt"�u 
Unitcrwrlt J 11.; C,1111/(1.osi-.)-' 1;ct l11vcst111cnt lni.:1..11uc 
fh:.11 ilc.d R..-.11 R.:.1l 
thu,ln.lJ_ lifl.i (Hdk:11 C.1rc) Ho,�w:11 J£!'l.L. �c,11 Care) 
H40,06�) $(Ul,0/U) $ ( 7 2 ,870) $ 2 , 2 7 �  $ 1,80$ $ 4 , I JU 
( J ,H5H) ( b ,204) ( 6 , 555) 1 ,616 2,598 2 , 746 
1 , 251  1 , 948 2,016 
18 , 130 2 1 , lll4 2H , 24 3  
l l , 761 lb , !,,59 1 6 , 71,H 
( 1 2 , 272)  .(H,892) ( lb ,J!,6)  
( 10 . )90) ( 1 2 ,052) ( 1 2 , 707) 
1 , 894 2 , 009 2 , 1 14 
1 , 011J 2,026 2 , 026 
2 , 1 1,9 ] , J11 ],447 
4 , 0':>l 6 , 016 6 , 10'.J 
7 , 1 4 3  10,057 10 , l 72 
IJ , 237 1 1 , 'Jfi.! 12 , )04 
9 , 515 11 ,061 1 1 ,fifil 
1 1 , 85) 12 ,576 ll,228 
8 , 250 8,250 8 , 250 
• Annuul kcportc. 




u1.111: CkUS!i A!m tH.Ut: Slllt'.J.I) Ut' Htil(l lt.\ 
UnJcrwr l l h't' JIIJ lnv,,,,;1 i;;:c11t lucu�/(1.o:,:i) 
( Ju  TI1uu•,.111,ls ) 
�75U�1ffi111o 
UuJcrwr i t l ll)' G.:1 1 1 1/(l.u��•l• Hcca�l 1/nJl! r wT J tlut:, (.;,1ln/(I.,,�:,)•• 
th-.,1 Y.c.a l  tkal Ht•,11 
�� .!£.r..!.L OI ... Jk,11 � lh11n1ou1 m (tb!Jc,11 c.1rc) 
$(40,065) $(1.0,01.J�) $(40,C!v�) 
( 3 , , 58 ( ) , 507)  ( 3 , 3?)) 
1 , 25 7  1 ,070 IJJ7 
111 , no 1 4 , n z  1 2 , 911➔ 
1 1 , 76 1  u,JJIJ 7 , 1 1 5  
( 1 2 , 272) ( 7 , 3 1 4 )  
( 1 0 , )90) ( 4 , 71)0) 
l , ti'J4 
2,016 
6 , 3% 
4 , 4 57 
( 4 , I L9) (2,485) ( 2 , 1 72) 
(14 ,639) (6, 71,9) ( 6,280) 
3, 143 
11 An1111.1l H.cpor-tu, 
u Statli;tk;\l Rt!puru. 
•u Ri.!..il Jolhr» rc.,£,.!&1.:nt.lni,; 1975  Jallr,r:J. 
Iii.lit.: &.:ROSS ,\IIU HI.Ut. :illlfl.11 or fl.tlKIU,\ 
�'��ncy lh·:ic rv..-:1 ).cvi.!l 
!.';.:!.£ 





t.:11rr,llrnc11t• L11ro l l ro,c11L 
(AVt:l :-tfll Cunlrn.:L9} � 
956 , 646 
1 H J ,OH 
H5] , 'J4J 
81 1 ,]88 
H l , 576 
HZ,833 19 
7:. 7 , 2 6 7  
C..9'1,486 
• Enroll�nt Reports 1411 and 1768, 
(l)u l l .ir:J Jn llious,111,b) 
(l'JH2 UL1 1 l 11 r u ) h  
i,.·111,rnci,1 1 S t .il,!Pl\:lll 11 "'  
��:!.!.�l_ \I� 
Rl!.il kt!al 
� J.£t!l (HcJkal L:..irl!) 
$ 1 2 ,  IJ7H $2 l  ,2�tt $22, llll 
l l , J':10 1 9 , l b l  llJ , 6 1 )  
1 5 , BH5 2J,C.5J 2J ,b)/  
40,501 57 ,676 �(,,)BO 
58, 24S 78,456 76, 1B11 
60,040 74,08? 73,00') 
60,261  c.6,249 60,7Jl  
78,01) 78,0l] 76,013 
u Aunual lh:porta..  Real dullard r-c� r.:,amt!ng 1982 0olJar.1. 
lnvc.:,t1u,ml .and 0Un:r IncoK..: 
lloal R"n) , 
Noui11..1l .1£!.'..!l (Hcdir.:�1 C.trll) 
$ 4 , lll $ 7 ,071  $ H , 2 1 3  
2,40H 3 , 968 4 , 1 9 3  
],208 'i , IJ 7 2  
l,063 7 , 518  
5 , 2 1S  7 , 343 
1 1 , 532 16, 228 
1 2 . �5 1  1 5 ,023 
1 2 , 775 13,554 
8 , JU8 8 , 708 
l , 146 
7 , 635 
7 ,426 
1 6 , C.9) 
1 5 ,839 
H , 2>7 
8 , 788 
kc,1l kt!Jl 
� 1flli (Hc.J!c.11 D.re) 
$ 4 , lll $ 4 , lll . $ 4 ,>ll 
2 ,468 2 , 141 
3 , 208 2 , 730 
5,06] 1 ,979  
� .215  ],697 
1 2 ,lJZ 7 , 468 
1 2 ,9Sl 5 , IJ70 
1 2 , 773 4,62S 
6,7815 2,f.H 
2 , 1 7 2  
4! , SlO 
] , !1 tlti 
J , l'.>5 
6 , 5::!9 
l , >56 
11 , l lll ' 
1 ,872 
f1uanc1al Sl.ilcmcut•111 
r.,mtin� J!�t.�.rvc InJlces 
Rt!.jl Real 
No0Jm1l 19'.11_ (l·lo?Jkal CHI.!) 
1 2:?  113  107 
312 271 
449 369 345 
403 348 330 
4G4 302 
601 367 353 
30 
H I UE rnn:;s ,\/lU 1111ft: �ll l fl.11 i W  fl.Ur.JU.\ 
t..nrull11ac11t ;1nJ t:,u1t l 11��� 
(llol lJC!> Ju 11mu:.;mJs) 
· (19Ts u ... �• 
Fl ll,11\C l .1 l St al t:a:,�11 l 
Ccmtlnpc11c'J.._ __ kc,;c1vc l.1.:v,!l 
fJn:mcJ,11 Stat�in,!nl 
Cuutingcucy l<c.!.t.:lCV-.! I111licc!l 
r,u·, ..i l  11-cnt �1autlr<;cnt Rc;d lic;., l  Real Real 




9 1 J ,OJ5 
05) . 5!,J 
lH l , )80 
797 , 571.J 
752 ,SJJ  






u Renl Jollars ..-cpn:11cnl1n1i 197� Joll.lr11, 
$ 1 2 , 978 $12 , �J 7U  $ 1 2 , 970 
1 2 , J'JU 11 ,671 1 1 , 2 1 )  
1 5,UUS l l , 'JJl 1 2 , 8�1 
4U,50] J;!,402 29 , )65 
su , 21,5 40,014 J6 ,U69 
60,040 ll,14 2  JI ,461 
60,281 2 / , JO/ 25, ll7 





4. No regulation of group life insurance rates - competition 
reduces price. 
5. Discrepancy between the rate of increase in hospital costs and 
the rate of increase in insurance premiums will only bring 
calls for more regulation of insurors. 
E. The Encouragement of Marketplace Incentives Alternative 
Selective rollback of laws and regulations which discourage 
competition and innovation. 
Use of buying power by large purchasers of health care 
services; Blue Cross, commercial carriers, large employers, 
government. 
Incentives for prudent selection of providers by individual 
consumers. 
Cost-sharing, public information and awareness. 
Development of competitive alternatives to current financing 
and provider arrangements. 
HMO/PPO 
Ambulatory surgery 
Freestanding emergency and primary care services 
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o Advantages 
Takes advantage of collective purchasing strength of large 
group purchasers. 
Rewards efficiency 
Encourages experimentation and innovation; development of 
alternative delivery and financing arrangements. 
Eliminates need for public agency. 
Elimination of mandatory benefits allows employer group to 
share benefits in conformance with needs of employees . 
o Disadvantages 
Little or no protection for individuals or small groups without 
bargaining power. 
Possibile adverse effect on access for medically indigent. 
F. The Competition Models 
l. Competition in other industries. 
o Airline deregulation has fostered the growth of new, lower 
cost, more efficient competitors. 
o Growth of commuter and feeder airlines as larger carriers 
abandon lower density markets. 
o Selective failures of older, less efficient carriers. 
o What we need are hospital failures - competition is the 
only way to equitably and efficiently accomplish this. 
2. Competition in the Health Care Industry. 
o "Retail" - Enthoven, dual-choice model; cost-sharing with 
employees provides incentives to select lower cost 
provider, alternative care setting. 
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o "Wholesale" - Prudent purchaser; third-party payors or 
government act as bargining agents and use collective 
purchasing power to obtain best prices for individual 
consumer. 
Examples of specific competitive forces 
-HMOs 
-PPOs 
-Growth of coalitions 
-Incentives furnished by Medicare prospective 
reimbursement. 
o Describe several iterations of the development of a 
competitive market in a major city (e.g. , Jacksonville) 
-status quo 
-impact of one HMO 
-varying alliances in PPOs , networking 
o Describe possible consequences on different categories of 
hospitals 
-high , medium , low cost 
-fully depreciated , highly leveraged 
G 
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o Describe impact on availability of access to care by market 
segment 
-under 65, 65+ 




Phase I � Initiation 
� Duration - On.e Year 
• Staff Model HMO 
:. One PPO 
a Impact Moderate 
Phase II - Growth 
• Duration - One Year 
• Second PPO Begun 
• Effects Beginning 
Phase Il l - Establishment 
• Duration - Two Year 
• Impact Realized 
• Increased Price Competition 




o Population - 600, 000 and growing moderately. 
o No dominate employer, six or seven medium-sized service industry 
companies. 
o Twelve hospitals including several relatively large teaching hospitals. 
o No active, implemented HMO. 
o No operational PPO ' s. 
o Relatively well-supplied on provider side. 
Hospital Focus : 
o Six Not-For-Profit Community Hospitals. 
o Two For-Profit Community Hospitals. 
o Three large community/teaching hospitals with variety of services. 
o One large teaching hospital with large indigent patient population. 
Phase I - Year One - Initiation 
o Staff - model HMO begins operation. Federally qualified. 
o Enrollment is slow to moderate in first six months. 
o Moderate in second six months. 
o No noticeable impact on provider community/price structure. 
o Planning for an insurance company affiliated PPO begins. 
o Provider community is interested. Unsure of effects. 
o PPO involving three hospitals and part of their espective medical 
staffs begins. 
o Initial employer interest among medium-sized companies is significant, 
but changeover is moderate. 
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COMPETITION SCENARIO - continued 
o Three hospitals and one large N-F-P hospital with variety of services. 
o All three hospitals, after adjusting for case-mix, are reasonable 
priced and well perceived in community but want {need) more 
business·. 
o Impact of PPO in Phase I is limited. Some discounting, but reasonable 
priced providers included in network. 
Phase II - Year Two - Growth 
o Staff model HMO enrollment develops further. Still below breakeven. 
o Stronger hand in provider contract negotiations. 
o Improves utilization control mechanisms. 
o A second PPO, hospital affiliated, is initiated in reaction to first 
PPO and growth of HMO. 
o Four hospitals -
o Two Not-for-Profit Community 
o One For-Profit Community 
o One larger N-F-P hosptial with variety of services. 
o Discounting from gross charges is more dramatic among these 
providers. Still covering more than cost. 
o Growth of first PPO is significant in this phase. 
o Several medium-sized employers shift. Enrollment approaches 50,000. 
o Providers begin to feel impact of shift of volume. 
o Providers also feel impact of utilization management programs. 
o Growth of second PPO is moderate. 
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COMPETITION SCENARIO - continued 
Phase III - Years Three & Four - Establishment 
o Staff Model HMO enrollment accelerates. Break-even is reached. 
o Greater "clout" in contract negotiation with hospitals. 
o Utilization decreases. 
o Second PPO begins more aggressive pricing strategy to compete. 
Reduces price close to cost. Considers pricing relationship to 
marginal costs. 
o Hospitals not involved in PPO or affiliated with HMO are growing more 
concerned. 
o Two hospitals , though , still not feeling significant effects. 
o Three hospitals are feeling effects of reduced volume. 
o Highly leveraged hospital with new plant , high fixed costs is 
particularly affected. Goes in "red" for first time in seven years. 
o Conservative , older hospital maintains positive bottom line but 
margin narrows. 
o Large university teaching hospital is developing plan to be 
city-wide PPO for the indigent with pricing by government close to 
marginal cost. 
o Community not large enough to support another PPO. 
o Utilization per 1000 persons in area decreases during this phase. 
o Effects of pricing competition are significant and result in further 
moderation of premium increases. 
37  
COMPETITION SCENARIO - continued 
Phase IV - Three Years - Maturity 
o Staff model HMO entrenched with demonstrated impact on providers. 
Satisfaction among members. Acceptance in the community. 
o First PPO is strongly established. Moderate price competition. 
Strengthens ties with providers. Initiates risk-sharing mechanisms. 
Movement toward IPA - type HMO. 
o Second PPO is established through significant price competition having 
a "bottom-line" effect on two of the four hospitals which had higher 
fixed costs. 
o Large university teaching hospital establishes 11niche 11 in the market 
despite some significant effects of its operations. 
o Two hospitals 11hemorraging 11 from effects of competition 
o Internal discussion of alternatives. 
o Community support of hospitals not clarified. 
o Bankruptcy. 





3. Results of Competition in the Health Care and Insurance 
Industries 
Purpose: 
To list the results of competition in the health care and 
health insurance industries. 
Health Care 
o Decreased utilization by HMO enrollees has resulted in a 
lesser premium rate of increase for HMO's than for 
traditional insurance plans . 
m 1 700 
QI , 
-our results; CHP and SFGH Inc. 
HMO HOSPITAL U TILIZATION IMPACT- . · 
(JUNE, 1982) 


















N ational Florida All  HMO's 
Blue Cross - Blue Cross Nationally 
Blue Shield BIL•e  Shield 






NA TIONWIDE PREMIUM INCREASES 
(I ndividual Coverage) 
1 980 1 982 % Increase 
HMO $44.40 $57 .37 29 .2% 
I nsurance 
P lans $39 .48 $57.86 · 49% 




o Initial PPO results 
-Mountain Medical Affiliates (Denver) 
INITIAL RES UL TS REPORTED BY 
AN ESTABLISHED PPO 
EMPLO YEE GROUP (JAN. 82 - AUG. 83) 





5.4 Days * 
$532 * 
5 .9  Days 
$635 
* Greater Severity of Illnesses + Intensity of Services 
• Payments to Physicians by this Denver PPO for 6 
Procedures Average 28% Less Than Denver Area UCR 
• ALOS for All Enrollees in this PPO Decreased from 
6.5 Days in 1 981 to 5.7 Days in June 1 983. 






CARRIER SWITCHING BEHA VIOR 
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Source: Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Florida Market Research Department 
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o Exit/entry of insurers into various markets 
MARKET ENTRY/EXIT 
(State of Florida Insurance Company 
Admissions & Withdrawals) 
Fiscal Year Total Total 
(July - June) Admissions Withdrawals 
1982-83 56 12 
1981-82 70 13 
1980-81 72 1 7  
1979-80 54 10 
1978-79 35 22 
Source: Report of the  Department of Insurance, :,tale of Florida 
4. Summary Review of Market and Competitive Models 
Pureose: 
To respond to criticisms of the pro-competition model . 
o Necessary time frames (breathing room for results to become 
apparent) 
o Indigent care 
o Medical education 
o Quality of care 
a. Impacts on premium costs. 
Title X IX and XV I I I  examples 
Medicare 






















83 85 88 
L Estimated_J 
Source: Wall Street ,1ournal, March, 1983 
REORGANIZATIONS OF 
TITLES XVIII and XIX 
• MEDICARE 
- Prospective Payment System 
• MEDICAID 
- Selective Contracting (California) 
- Physician Case Management (Michigan) 
- Florida Experiments 
-Selective contracting (California) 
-Physician case management (Michigan) 
-ACCESS Plan (Arizona) 
COMPARISON OF ACCESS AND MEDICAID 
ACCESS 
Statewide competitive bid­
ding by providers for 
ACCESS c ontracts; local 
competition for patients. 
Health care providers re­
imbursed statewide on a pre­
paid, capitated basis.  
Primary care physicians act 
as "gatekeepers" for the 
system. 
Private administrator with 
operational  responsibility. 
Cost-effect ive package of 
benefits w i th some exclus­
ions such as long term care, 
routine dental care. 
Inclusion of public and pri­
vate employees without 
subsidy and low-income 
population . 
Nominal c o-payments for 
subsidize_d population. 
MEDICAID· 
Any provider may partici­
pate; no competition. 
Providers generally reim­
bursed on a fee-for-service 
basis. 
Patients have total freedom 
of choice of providers; self­
referral to specialty care; 
potential for abuses. 
Administered by state 
agency. 
More comprehensive range 
of benefits. 
Eligibility usually limited to 
AFDC and SSI recipients and 
other indigents . 
No co-payments . 
Source: Arizona Department of Health Services 
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-Florida experiments - Four modules 
(Continuation endorsed by Governor's Task Force) 
(1) Comeetitive Alternative Health Plans 
(2) Recipient case management 
(3) Prepaid risk arrangements 
(4) Health Care Vouchers 
o Maintaining benefits, but reducing costs through 
competitive approaches. 
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o To list those factors which distinguish the Florida environment 
from states in which regulatory solutions such as rate-setting have 
been imelemented. 
o To emphasize environmental factors which suggest that further 
regulation is unnecessary or existing regulation is ineffective. 
A. The Health Care Marketplace {significant/distinctive Florida 
factors) 
The Florida environment contains the pre-conditions for and is 
moving toward the establishment of price competition in the health 
care industry {without increased regulation). 
1. Demand Aspects 
- Demographics 
o The elderly 
o Tourists/seasonal residents 
o Non-uniform distribution of age groups 
o Growth {net in-migration) 
o Population concentration in metro areas 








1 0  
0 
EMPLOYER CONTRIBUTIONS TO 
HEALTH INSURANCE PLANS 




� Family Plan 
_ 22% 
1 6% �� 1 7% - -,w<'h .,._� 
-,_, 6% f.�� 
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Source: Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Florida 
2. Supply Aspects 
o Facilities 
-Hospital Beds 
(Oversupply, occupancy rates , and 
concentration/distribution) 
ACCESS TO HOSPITALS 
• 87.9% of Florid ians l ive i n  
l\{letropol itan Areas (SMSA 's) 
• 80% of Florid� Hospitals are i n  
Metropol itan Areas 
Source: 1980 U.S. Census, FHA Fact Book 




Metropolitan 172 80% 43, 1 34 91% 
Non-Metropol itan 43 20% 4 ,398 9% 
Total 215 100% 47 ,532 100% 
United States 
M etropol itan 3,048 52% 764,444 76% 
Non-Metropol itan 2,765 48% 238, 991 24o/o 





















FLORIDA HMO ENROLLMENT 
- Actual Enrollment 
� Projected Enrollment 
(% Change from previous year) 
(62%) 
(66%) ?/,· . 220 000 
, . . ,x 
J '(' .. �
( 
,.:}. 
(42%) '� , � 
1 ,335,000 
(30%) 
(1 901.) (4 1 %) 
■ � f@·-·
ra
--- ( 1 07%) (46%) 
,o 
: . . ... "/" $:t;-0 - -- -- -- -- < � -� . ·  .� i'S . .  ,, 
1 978 1979 1 980 1 981  1 982 1 983 1 984 1 985 1 986 1 987 1 988 
Sources: 1) National HMO Census, lnterstudy, 2) Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Florida, Inc;. 
-Relative shortage of nursing home beds 




1 970 7,544 
1 972 9,600 
1 974 1 1 ,400 
1 976 1 3 ,400 
1 978 1 5,450 
1 980 17 ,500 





573 8 ,1 1 7  
625 1 0,225 
730 1 2, 1 30 
810 1 4, 2 1 0 
890 1 6, 340 
980 18,480 























-Increases in number of physicians (in-migration and 
foreign medical graduates) 
-Increases in hospital personnel (without related 
increases in productivity) 
3. Range of Prices Charged 
B. Health Insurance Marketplace 
o The existence of price competition 
-# of health insurers 
FLORIDA GROUP ACCIDENT 
& HEAL TH INSURANCE 
MARKET SHARE IS FRAGMENTED * :  
• Nearly 600 Companies Earning Group 
Accident and Health Premiums 
• Only 4 Firms Have Market Shares 
Exceeding 5% 
• Only 19 Firms Have Market Shares 
Exceeding 1 % 
• Top 10  Firms Account for 59% 
of Premiums Written 
• Top 50 Firms Account for 85% of Premiums 
Written; Remaining 15% Shared by More 
Than 500 Carriers 
* Market Shares Computed on Basis of Premiums Written in 
Florida on Group Accident and Health,  1 981 
Source: Florida State Insurance Department Annual Reports 
-# of self-insurers 

















Source: 1 983 Survey of Employer Health Care Benefits Plans 







o Fragmentation of market share 
-control of Florida health insurance market contrasted with 
other states 
o List of four major market segments in Florida 
-different insurers compete in different market segments 
o Non-profitability (underwriting losses and the abandonment 
of the direct pay market) 
o Existence of wide-spread cost-sharing contracts and 
employee contribution to premiums. 
o Availability of consumer information 
-Florida Hospital Cost Containment Board 
-Medicare Supplement Shopper's Guide 
-Available options do not provide relevant alternatives 
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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FLORIDA HEALTH CARE MARKETPLACE 
0 
P.EC01",1:E1:!lATI01iS 
1. DEREGULATE PROV r DERS ;.,ID INSUi<!:"S 
2, PASS EXCESS P?OFITS LA', : 
3' EsTABL I  SH GovERIIOR , s Co/�'11 ss 1011 AND CONDUCT STUDY 
4, ESTABL I SH OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE IN LEG[ SLATURE 
5. ELIMINATE MAtlD,HED srnEFITS 
6, ft.LTcR r'.ED ICA t D  PROG,iAM 
O PRUDENT S �'! Eil 
0 PROSPECT [ VE c� l :13URSEl·'ENT 
7, PROTECT PPC A:ID NETi/0.�K DEVELOPMENT 
1. Deregulate providers and insurers. 
a. Removal of unnecessary regulations on all health insurance 
products. 
b. Alternatively; allow major health insurers to offer an 
experimental policy to small groups and individuals without any 
regulation, i. e. , 
o no mandated benefits 
o no prior approval of forms/rates 
o no participation in the Guaranty Fund 
Protection for Purchasers of Non-Regulated Policies 
o Insurers must demonstrate their solvency 
Dept. of Insurance and a legislative oversight committee would 
play a facilitating role, i. e. ,  monitor the performance of 
these policies over a two-year period, and then suggest to the 
legislature any regulations necessary to protect' subscribers. 
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Exeected Results 
Premium prices for the non-regulated policies will be 
significantly lower. 
Criterion for success of these policies should be the number of 
enrollees they attract. 
Insurers will quickly (less than 6 months) enter into the 
marketplace with these non-regulated policies. 
Establishment of Governor's Commission. 
BCBSF will make a substantial contribution toward a research 
study (by a major Florida University) that will evaluate the 
effectiveness of these policies. 
Passage of an excess profits law. 
2. Expansion and Additional Funding for Florida Medicaid ' s  Alternative 
Health Plans. 
o Assure that sufficient funding is available to these 
experimental modules so that private organizations have 
incentives to contract with Medicaid's Alternative Health 
Plans. (Our HMO 1 s did not respond to a RFP to provide pre-paid 
care because we would have lost money on the process. Only two 
other Florida HMO's responded to this bid) . 
3. Protect PPO and networking development. 
o Congressman Leyden's Bill (H. R. 2956) 
o Preempts state barriers to PPO formation. 
BCA/BSA Position 
o Leyden's Bill is sound in concept but needs the following 
changes: 
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-Removal of Anti-trust exemption that would allow 
joint negotiations by one or more insurers (HIAA 
position) 
-Needs to address state PPO laws, like Virginia's 
which mandate that all providers must be allowed to 
contract with PPO 
-Leyden may amend his Bill to encourage mandatory 
rate-setting in those states which don't pass PPO 
laws. 
(CAVEAT : Wisconsin recently passed PPO protection law, but also passed 
rate-setting). 
